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THE GRAND JURY: PAST-PRESENT-NO FUTURE
THEODoRE M. KRANITZ*
"Grand jury in session." No more fearsome words can echo through
the circuit courthouses of this state. When the chains of this common
law relic rattle, few there are who do not stir uneasily in the vicinity,
behind bland exteriors. Feasance to law and duty is small comfort, for
in this day of sometimes irresponsible rapid public communication,
suspicion, ignorant criticism, even political ill-will can be as destructive
as outright accusation, and accusation is equal to public, if not judicial,
conviction. It is not amiss, therefore, to inquire into some of the
antecedents of the creature, and to know what to advise a client who will
perhaps testify when there is a "grand jury in session."'
I
We form a quick mental image when a grand jury sits. We visualize
twelve men seated more or less around a conference table in a dosed
room near the circuit court, attended on the inside by the prosecuting
attorney and on the outside bya deputy sheriff. W-e know our federal
constitution requires thatno man be tried for crime except upon present-
ment of a grand jury.2 But it was not always so.
The grand jury dates from the time of Henry II (1154-89), who
caused panels of twelve men, appointed by the sheriff, to be charged
with the duty of accusing any persons in the locality suspected of crime.3
But this bare statement is an oversimplification. The Supreme Court
once delved into the historical form, in Hurtado v. California,4 and came
up with this statement:
We learn of its constitution and functions from the Assize of
*Attorney, St. Joseph, Missouri; B.S. (F.S.), Georgetown University, 1948, LL.B.,
1950.
1. Judicial procedure relating to grand jury presentments, the preservation of
the secrecy of the body, and such other post-indictment matters are outside the scope
of this Article.
2. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. This, by the way, is the sole function of a federal
grand jury: the investigation of crime and the consequent finding of indictments.
3. Womsm, THE LAw 251 (1949).
4. 110 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1884).
(318)
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Clarendon, A.D. 1164,[ 5] and that of Northampton, A.D. 1176,
Stubbs' Charters, 143-150. By the latter of these, which was a
republication of the former, it was provided, that "if any one is
accused before the justices of our Lord the King of murder, or
theft, or robbery, or of harboring persons committing those
crimes, or of forgery or arson, by the oath of tweve knights of the
hundred, or, if there are no knights, by the oath of twelve free
and lawful men, and by the oath of four men from each township
of the hundred, let him go to the ordeal of water, and, if he fails,
let him lose one foot. And at Northampton it was added, for
greater strickness of justice..., that he shall lose his right hand
at the same time with his foot, and abjure the realm and exile
himself from the realm within forty days. And if he is acquitted
by the ordeal, let him find pledges and remain in the kingdom,
unless he is accused of murder or other base felony by the body
of the country and the lawful knights of the country; but if he
is so accused as aforesaid, although he is acquitted by the ordeal
of water, nevertheless he must leave the kingdom in forty
days and take his chattels with him, subject to the rights of his
lords, and he must abjure the kingdom at the mercy of our Lord,
the King." "The system thus established . .. [6] is simple. The
body of the country are the accusers. Their accusation is pra-
tically equivalent to a conviction, subject to the chance of a
favorable termination of the ordeal by water. If the ordeal
fails, the accused person loses his foot and hand. If it succeeds,
he is nevertheless, to be banished. Accusation, therefore, was
equivalent to banishment, at least."7 (Emphasis added.)
You perhaps wonder about the ordeal by water. This marvelous
piece of trial ingenunity worked like this: The person who underwent
the ordeal appealed to God to prove his innocence by protecting him from
harm; at least, he customarily did, though such appeal was by no means
obligatory. The trick was then to plunge one's arm to the elbow in
boiling water.8 Small wonder there were few acquittals; even so, the
hand was lost in any event.
Henry II was the 26th king of England and first of the House of
Anjou. His Legis Henrici is the foundation for much of our common
5. The Supreme Court may have had its date wrong. Some histories date the
Assize of Clarendon at 1166. 2 POLLoCK & MArILAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 642
(2d ed. 1923); AMONTGO7iERY, LEADING FACTS OF ENGLISH HISTORY XXXIV (1901).
6. 1 STEPHENS, HISTORY OF CRI~nrAL LAW OF ENGLAND 252 (1883).
7. Substitute "trial" for "ordeal," and loss of liberty for the older more brutal
forms of punishments, and it is clear that time has not changed the results very much.
8. MONTGOMERY, Op. cit. supra note 5, at 50-51.
1959]
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law. Henry sired three sons: The eldest, the romantic idol at some time
of every boy, was Richard I, Coeur de Lion, who came to the throne in
1189, and reigned a decade. The second son was Gregory, who did not
survive, and Gregory's son, Arthur, was murdered, it is said, by Henry's
youngest son, John (although no grand jury was ever called to investi-
gate the matter). John, then, who was reluctantly to take his place in
history as the signer of Magna Carta, succeeded to the throne in 1199
and there remained until 1216. His son, Henry 1I1, occupied the throne
until 1272.
This bit of history is not amiss. In 1215, the last year of the reign of
King John, the ordeal by water was abolishedY It was little improvement,
however, for by the end of the reign of Henry III, it was still common
that the question of guilt or innocence should be submitted to the
presenting (now grand) jury, to the jury of another hundred (or
township), and to the four vills; these formed a single body which
delivered a unanimous verdict. 10
The reasons that the system met with growing opposition are
obvious. Furthermore, jurors as well as defendants became unhappy,
because if the jury verdict was not satisfactory to the justices, the
jurors themselves were often fined or imprisoned. There thus arose a
practice of permitting the accused to challenge his inquisitors, and no
grand juror could act as trial juror if the accused objected." By 1352, in
the reign of Edward III, a statute was necessary and enacted, Lstablishing
the general principle that a man's indictors were not to serve as both
grand and trial jurors.12
Still later it became the practice for the court to authorize the
sheriff of each county to return the names of twenty-four or more
persons, from whom the grand jury was chosen; the number gradually
settled to twenty-three, a majority of whom must consent in order to
frame a valid indictment. Thus it became the custom that however many
attended, or actually officiated, at least twelve must concur in presenting
an offender.13
9. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 5, at 647.
10. Id. at 646.
11. State v. Kavanaugh, 32 N.M. 404, 258 Pac. 209 (1927).
12. 2 POLLOCK & MrLAND, op. cit. supra note 5, at 649.
13. State v. Kavanaugh, supra note 11.
[Vol. 24
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The evolution of the modern process of indictment by a grand jury
and trial by a petit jury was still far off. The details of this growth lie
buried in the archives of the fourteenth century, 14 and we only know
today, since historians have not yet completed their tasks, the form into
which it emerged in the fifteenth century and was brought into the
federal constitution in the Bill of Rights on December 15, 1791.
Thus, as the system finally evolved, in the description of the
Supreme Court,
S.. criminal prosecutions were instituted at the suit of private
prosecutors, to which the King lent his name in the interest
of the public peace and good order of society. In such cases
the usual practice was to prepare the proposed indictment and
lay it before the grand jury for their consideration. There was
much propriety in this, as the most valuable function of the
grand jury was not only to examine into the commission of
crimes, but to stand between the prosecutor and the accused, and
to determine whether the charge was founded on credible
testimony or was dictated by malice or personal ill will [of the
prosecuting officials]. 13
What has happened to this latter most important function we shall
presently see.
So much for the historical foundations of the grand jury system,
and the evolution of that august institution (which, incidentally, was
abolished in the country of its birth, in 1933). So much, indeed, for the
American federal grand jury. We are most particularly concerned with
the system as it operates in Missouri, and with its present-day value.
II
The Territory of Missouri achieved statehood on August 10, 1821. It
had drawn and adopted a constitution on July 19, 1820, which became
effective on the date President Monroe proclaimed statehood. Article
XIII of the constitution of 1820 provided:
That the general, great and essential principles of liberty and,
free government may be recognized and established, we
declare: ...
14. 2 PoLLOcx & MVArrLAND, op. cit. supra note 5, at 649.
15. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 59 (1906).
1959]
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14. That no person can, for an indictable offense, be pro-
ceeded against criminally by information, except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual
service in time of war or public danger, or by leave of court, for
oppression or misdemeanor in office.
This provision remained unchanged in our organic law for eighty
years, 16 and was the only constitutional reference to a grand jury. Thus
an indictment was required to be taken as at common law, and in that
sense, an accusation was required to be by twelve men of the same county
where the offense was committed,17 and the grand jury could not indict
persons for the committing of misdemeanors (i.e., non-indictable offenses
at common law) other than in public office. 18 The first of these require-
ments still obtains.
On November 16, 1900, by amendment to the state bill of rights, the
constitution of 1875 was changed, effective November 30 of that year.
Article II, section 12 of the organic law was amended to read:
12. No person shall be prosecuted criminally for felony or
misdemeanor otherwise than by indictment or information,
which shall be concurrent remedies, but this shall not be con-
strued to apply to cases arising in the land or naval forces or in
the militia when in actual service in time of war or public
danger.
In addition, a new section was inserted in article II, which provided in
part:
28 .... Hereafter a grand jury shall consist of twelve men,
any nine of whom concurring may find an indictment or true
bill: Provided, however, that no grand jury shall be convened
except upon an order of a judge of a court having the power to
try and determine felonies; but when.so assembled such grand
jury shall have power to investigate and return indictments for
all character and grades of crime.
Now the grand jury had the constitutional power to concern itself
vith misdemeanors as well as felonies, although the power appears to
have been legislatively assigned as early as 1845.19 These provisions
16. Mo. CONST. art. I, § 14 (1865); Mo. CONST. art. II, § 12 (1875).
17. Ex parte Slater, 72 Mo. 102 (1880).
18. State v. Berlin, 42 Mo. 572 (1868); State v. Ebert, 40 Mo. 186 (1867).
19. RSMo 1845, at 314; Mo. Laws 1877, at 279, § 540.240, RSMo 1949.
[Vol. 24
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remain substantially unchanged in the constitution of 1945, except that
a grand jury is now composed of twelve citizens, not merely men: women
are eligible since 1945; and it is additionally provided "that the power
of grand juries to inquire into the willful misconduct in office of public
officers, and to find indictments in connection therewith, shall never be
suspended." 20
Constitutional provisions generally require the aid of subsequent
legislative enactment. The early laws of Missouri were sketchy and
wholly inadequate in respect of the powers and organization of grand
juries. The first new power came soon, in 1825, when it was made
obligatory that each grand jury inspect the county jail,21 a requirement
that remains to this day.22
In the same year, the Act of February 14, 1825, was enacted and has
never been changed except to eliminate reference to sex, so that it read
and still reads:
. .'. every ... juror [grand and petit] shall be a citizen of this
state, and resident within the county, [sober and intelligent, of
good reputation,] and above the age of twenty-one years, [and
otherwise qualified]. 23 (The bracketed material appears in the
present statute, and was covered by various sections of the Act
of February 14, 1825.)
The first series of major enactments came in 1835, and have re-
mained substantially unchanged these 124 years. This legislation specifi-
cally rendered a grand juror incompetent if he was the prosecutor or
complainant or a witness for either,2 4 and incompetent to serve later on
the petit jury frying the indictment brought in by him.25 Further, it
was provided that, when so required, the prosecuting attorney must
attend the grand jury to examine witnesses and advise on the law;2 6 he
may attend on his own request, but may not remain in any event while
the grand jurors express their opinions or are voting.2 7 For the first time,
a unanimous return was not required and the concurrence of only twelve
20. Mo. CoNsT. art. I, §§ 16, 17 (1945).
21. § 8, at 412, RSMo 1825.
22. § 221.300, RSMo 1949.
23. Terr. Laws 1824, at 238. §§ 2, 6, at 467, RSMo 1825, now § 494.010, RSMo 1949.
24. § 2, at 479, RSMo 1835, now § 540.060, RSMo 1949.
25. § 6, at 490, RSMo 1835, now § 546.110, RSMo 1949.
26. § 6, at 479, RSMo 1835, now § 540.130, RSMo 1949.
27. § 7, at 479, RSMo 1835, now § 540.140, RSMo 1949.
1959]
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grand jurors was sufficient; an indictment may now be presented upon
the concurrence of nine or more grand jurors only.28
There were numerous other provisions contained in the act of 1835,
of a technical nature outside the scope of this discussion. Only one other
matter need concern us: the granting to the grand jury of the power to
subpoena witnesses.2 9 So broad and unrestricted a power apparently
came to be abused, however, to the injury of persons accused. As a
result, the legislature, in 1899, restricted the use of the power, so that
now no person may be subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury if he is
or will be or the foreman believes him to be a witness in the defense of a
person whom the grand jury has indicated. 30 Thus, the grand jury may
not indict a person and then proceed to reveal his defense to the prosecut-
ing attorney by compelling the witnesses for the accused to come before
it and, under the interrogation of the prosecutor, reveal the things to
which they will testify on trial. The statute, of course, has the glaring
weakness that it can be circumvented simply by holding back the
presentment of an indictment until after the defense witnesses have been
interrogated.
As a direct corollary to the foregoing rule, it is not within the power
of a grand jury to subpoena any person to testify in regard to any matters
in which the vtness himself is under investigation. 31 This rule is
frequently and flagrantly abused. More on this subject later.32
The powers and duties of the grand jury were not set out in the act
of 1835,^except as above noted, and they remained as at common law.
But the legislature took cognizance of this ommission in 1845 with a
statute which, like its predecessors, is substantially the same today.
This act provided for the first time that the grand jury must be convened
on the order of a judge of a court having jurisdiction to try and determine
felonies, with power in the grand jury to investigate, nevertheless, and
return indictments for all grades of crimes, misdemeanors as well as
felonies.33 The method of selecting the grand jury was not clear before
this time, and the act directs that the order of the judge convening the
28. § 19, at 481, RSMo 1835, now § 540.250, RSMo 1949.
29. § 8, at 480, RSMo 1835, now § 540.160, RSMo 1949.
30. Mo. Laws 1899, at 172, now § 540.160, RSMo 1949.
31. State v. Naughton, 221 Mo. 398, 120 S.W. 53 (1909).
32. See pt. MI, infra.
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body may be directed either to the clerk of the jury commission (who
is also clerk of the circuit court) or to the sheriff. The exact method as
we know it today did not come about until 1931.34 Under the provisions of
the Act of March 27, 1845 the jury is directed to examine public buildings
and report on their conditions; inquire into violations of the fish and
game laws, the'various liquor laws, the election laws, and such other
violations as the court may direct; inquire into the failure or refusal of
county and municipal officers to perform their duties, and to investigate
any violations by county officers of laws relating to the finances or
financial administration of the county.35
Finally, it was specifically provided, in 1865, that a grand jury shall
consist of twelve persons. 36
III
There is one more field to consider: the practical considerations
which face the lawyer when his client calls and says, "I've been sub-
poenaed to testify before the county grand jury." He knows he cannot
accompany his client into the chambers. What shall he advise?
Of course, every situation is unique. The lawyer must weigh all the
considerations and counsel in each case as the circumstances demand.
Some factors are constant, however.
In the first place, almost every grand jury will have members whose
mental bent is to indict at any opportunity; similarly, there will be those
whose inclination is to avoid accusation if at all possible. In between
are those who will follow one side or the other, dependent upon suasion.
A review of the jury list and an appraisal of its members, particularly the
foreman, will help evaluate the initial situation, and to predict the climate
into which the witness must step.37
A little power makes men heady, and grand jurors are prone to all
human frailties. It is with reluctance that a witness should be advised to
avail himself of the legal safeguards attendant upon his appearance, for in
the prevailing atmosphere mere inquisitiveness-not even suspicion--can
34. Mo. Laws 1931, at 191, now §§ 495.010, .020, RSMo 1949.
35. RSMo 1845, at 314, now § 540.020(2), RSMo 1949.
36. § 8, at 597, GS 1865, now § 540.010, RSMo 1949.
37. Of course, this thought is of little value in the dense population centers in
Jackson and St. Louis counties, and in the City of St. Louis.
1959]
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be turned often to ungrounded conviction by even the most respectful
and proper declination to answer questions. At the same time, a person
under investigation cannot be compelled to come before the grand jury
and either confess his guilt or commit perjury,38 1 and thus there must be
truth or silence.
The legal protection afforded a witness is clear. Both the Consti-
tution of the United States39 and the Missouri constitution of 194540
contain the privilege against self-incrimination. No provision more
universally appears in the organic law of all American jurisdictions, and
none is more uniformly interpreted. Within this protection is the rule that
the witness before the grand jury need not even claim his privilege
against self-incrimination where it appears that the investigation in which
he testifies is directed against him.41 No person whose alleged crimes are
under investigation by a grand jury may be hailed unwillingly before
that body and questioned as to such crimes.42 Of course, if a witness is
told, upon inqury or voluntarily, that his conduct is the subject of investi-
gation, he has the right to refuse to answer any questions whatsoever,
and even answers to seemingly non-incriminating questions will not con-
stitute a waiver of the privilege and will vitiate any subsequent indict-
ment.
43
The oath administered by the foreman of the grand jury takes the
usual form of oaths to witnesses, with a statutory addition relating to the
preservation of secrecy.4 4 To this form prescribed by statute, a new twist
has been devised to put the witness (if he is aware of it at all) on the
horns of a dilemma. The oath is administered with the additional words," ,
"and that you do not have to answer any question which may tend to
incriminate you. So help you, God."
The average nervous and uninformed witness will unhesitatingly
take oath as changed. In this fortunate case (for the prosecution), it is
38. State v. Caperton, 276 Mo. 314, 207 S.W. 795 (1918).
39. U.S. CoxsT. amend. V.
40. Mo. CoNsT. art. I, § 19.
41. Counselman v. .itchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892); State v. Naughton, 221 Mo.
398, 120 S.W. 53 (1909); United States v. Edgerton, 80 Fed. 374 (D.C. Mont. 1897).
42. State v. Caperton, supra note 38.
43. State v. Naughton, supra note 41. This is the leading case in Missouri on the
subject.
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perhaps taken-and is certainly intended to be taken-as a warning that
the witness is the party under investigation and further as an apprisal to
him of his rights. The hidden ball trick may have worked,46 although it
is clear that no forthright warning has been given.
But suppose the witness has been warned by counsel beforehand, or
he is perceptive enough to catch this extra-statutory clause. Now the
dilemma is clear. If he refuses the oath in that form he may be held con-
tumacious or contemptuous; his position in any event before the grand
jury will not be improved. The possibilities inherent Mi accepting the
oath have already been pointed out. Until an appellate court rules the
question, it would seem that the only safe course is respectfully to decline
to take the oath but to offer to take it in pure statutory form. Let the
foreman or the prosecutor then be compelled, if he is willing, to advise
the witness forthrightly that he is under investigation and that he may
decline to answer any questions whatsoever, incriminating or otherwise,
in line with the rule in the Naughton case. 47
IV
In evaluating the residual benefits of grand jury proceedings, we must
start with recognition of one central fact: proceeding by information or
by grand jury indictment are concurrent remedies.48 The old theory that
the grand jury "stands between the prosecutor and the accused," for
the purpose of ascertaining "whether the charge was founded on credible
testimony or was dictated by malice or personal ill will" 49 is long since
without value. The grand jury does not stand between the prosecutor
and the accused because the prosecutor can proceed by information in
any event. Furthermore, since an information charging a felony must be
heard preliminarily before a magistrate trained in the law, the magistrate
rather than the grand jury more truly stands between; there is no pre-
liminary hearing on an indictment.
When certain types of public oppressions are to be unearthed, where
public officials, particularly in the judicial and enforcement branches, are
misusing their offices, where the nature of the suspected crime almost (it
46. I say "may" because this new device has not yet been subjected to judicial
scrutiny.
47. State v. Naughton, supra notes 41, 43.
48. MO. CONST. art. II, § 12 (1875); MO. CONST. art. I, § 17 (1945).
49. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 59 (1906).
19591
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never entirely or really) calls for the ringing of the tocsin to bring out the
self-righteous vigilantes, then the value of secret grand jury proceedings
is apparent, for the grand jury is peculiarly beyond the control of such
officials when public management is under investigation. Again, the
grand jury's in effect supervisory function over public institutions and
those new and special (as distinguished from historical and inquisitorial)
powers mentioned in the act of 1825 and the second part of the act of
1845, are of lasting benefit. As an inquisitorial body generally, for the
presenting of accusations of crimes, the grand jury is a relic which should
take its place upon the dusty shelves of legal history, beside other ancient
common law practices. Its office is more than filled by the modern
alternative procedure of proceeding by information.
This conclusion is not original. Learned essays and competent
surveys indicate and have indicated for over thirty-five years that the
efficacy of the grand jury is long since dessicated. Bettman and Burns,
in their survey on Criminal Justice in Cleveland, write that "generally
the grand jury does little more than rubber-stamp the opinion of the
prosecutor. It is almost exclusively dependent upon him for its knowl-
edge of the law, and for its information on the facts it is almost entirely
dependent on his zeal and willingness." 50 What the grand jury brings
forth rests, not on what the law is, but on what the prosecuting attorney
says it is; not on what the facts are, but on what construction-or implica-
tion-the prosecuting attorney gives the facts by the evidence (if any)
which he presents or withholds. Today, the grand jury may well be, in
given circumstances, the skirt behind which an over-zealous or malicious
or even corrupt prosecutor may hide to destroy the accused in the white-
hot light of public accusation, without merit, and without fear of retri-
bution in the form of a suit for malicious prosecution.
The National Committee on Law Obervance and Enforcement con-
ducted a nationwide survey in 1931. Its findings covered the entire
United States. The committee said:
Every prosecutor knows, and every intelligent person who has
ever served on a grand jury knows, the prosecuting officer
almost invariably dominates the grand jury.... The grand jury
usually degenerates into a rubber stamp wielded by the prose-
cuting officer according to the dictates of his own sense of
50. BETiAN & BumNs, CRIMNAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND 211-12 (1922).
[Vol. 24
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propriety and justice. . . . If the State's attorney wished to
prosecute [the innocent citizen], he could easily obtain an indict-
ment from a grand jury which he dominates. 51
This is no small matter. As was pointed out early in this Article, an
accusation is as socially and economically damning as a conviction, and
James Thurber's tongue was not entirely in cheek when he wrote in one
of his fables, "Guilt by exoneration! What a lovely way to end his use-
fulness!"5 2
51. NATIONAL CoMMrITEE ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON PROSE-
CUTION 124-26 (1931), citing Illinois survey at 299, 218.
52. THURBER, FURTFER FABLES OF OUR Tms 102 (1956).
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